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COMMENT
THE U.S.-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: FOSTERING
CONFIDENCE AND COMMITMENT IN ASIA
INTRODUCTION
We need markets-big markets-around the world in which to buy and
sell.'
Regional trading blocs have attracted much attention in recent years.
While regional trade agreements (RTAs) among nation states have been de-
cidedly popular,3 their virtue among economists and trade experts has been
decidedly mixed." Regionalism,' by its very nature, is discriminatory in prac-
tice to non-members." Reciprocal trade preferences are extended only be-
1. J. ORLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 6 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Wil-
liam Clayton, assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs). The statement reflects the
vision and hopes of the U.S. and Great Britain under the Bretton Woods Accord of 1944 of
the post World War II era. Id.
2. See Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/whatise/tiLe/beyl-e.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). The European Union (EU),
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and the Australia-New Zea-
land Closer Economic Relations Agreement, to name a few, have all featured prominently in
recent international trade relations. Id.
3. See id According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the vast majority of mem-
bers today are party to one or more RTAs. Id. Some 265 RTAs had been reported to the WTO
as of May 2003, of which 138 were notified after January 1995. Id. There are currently over
190 RTAs in force, and by the end of 2005, the total number of RTAs in force may well ap-
proach 300 if those reportedly planned or currently under negotiation are finally concluded.
Id.
4. See generally BERNARD K. GORDON, AMERICA'S TRADE FOLLIES: TURNING ECONOMIC
LEADERSHIP INTO STRATEGIC WEAKNESS (Routledge 2001). While economists normally stress
that, as a general matter, regional trade groupings and preferences do not automatically reduce
trade, they nevertheless highlight that regionalism is about extending preferences to only
member nations. Id. at 13.
5. See Regional Trade Agreements: Scope of RTAs, at http://www.wto.org/english
/tratope/regione/scopertae.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). "Regionalism is described in the
Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, as 'actions by governments to liberalize or facilitate trade
on a regional basis, sometimes through free-trade areas or customs unions." Id. However,
RTAs may be agreements between countries not necessarily belonging to the same geo-
graphical region. Id. For purposes of this Comment, the term "RTAs" is used to refer only to
FIAs.
6. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 14.
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tween member nations while non-members are often left on the outside,
relegated to leftovers after better tariff rates, better access to markets and
better trade relationships have been parceled out. Thus, on a conceptual
level, regionalism runs counter to the principles of free, open and non-
discriminatory trade under the current global regime of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now, the World Trade Organization
(WTO).7 So why does it seem like the United States-the primary advocate
of international trade liberalization predicated on a network of multilateral
institutions -is now advocating a departure from its official policy of multi-
lateralism after almost half a century? The answer to that question may lie in
the GATT itself.9 However, the implications of a U.S. policy favoring re-
gional and bilateral agreements are far-reaching and foreshadow the unravel-
ing of the accomplishments and developments under a multilateral system.
This Comment examines the ramifications of a U.S. policy, both official and
unofficial, of regional trade agreements and how the U.S.-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement (USSFTA), itself an RTA, may just be the answer to the
brewing problem. Part I provides a historical perspective, outlining the re-
cent international scramble to sign RTAs and sets the stage for the USSFTA
today. Part II discusses the terms of the USSFTA and the benefits that will
flow to the U.S. investor under the agreement. Part I concludes with some
reflections on the USSFTA and weighs in on the pros and cons of the
agreement and the course of U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
I. BACKGROUND: FROM MULTILATERIALISM TO REGIONALISM AFTER
WORLD WAR II
Despite the recent flurry of attention, regional blocs are not a modem
evolutionary invention of international trade." Rather, the roots of RTAs ex-
tend back to before the Second World War and parallel the development of
international markets during the colonial period." Regional arrangements of
that era centered on trade and currency blocs and were primarily used as a
7. Id. at 13. They run counter to each other on a conceptual level because GATT's Arti-
cle 24 actually expressly permits the formation of RTAs to augment multilateral agreements,
as long as they "aim to reduce trade barriers." Id. A main purpose for the insertion of this pro-
vision originally "was to legitimize the hoped-for European Economic Community[,]" so as
to entice its original members to join the GATT; since the formation of the EU under this ex-
ception provision, almost all subsequent RTAs have cite Article 24 for international legiti-
macy. Id.
8. See generally Judith H. Bello, Rising Tides: The Many-Faceted Benefits of Global
Trade Liberalization, A.S.I.L PRoc. 86 (1999).
9. See Anne 0. Krueger, Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas, in REGIONALISM
VERSUS MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 9, 13 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne 0. Krueger eds.,
1997). As long as the preferences under the RTAs "(1) are 100 percent, (2) cover substantially
all trade [between the members], (3) do not raise protection against third countries, and (4)
have a definite timetable for implementation[,]" they are permissible. Id.
10. GORDON, supra note 4, at 1.
11. Id. at 11-12.
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means to "militate against outsiders" in order to foster domestic industry."
Indeed, it was deeply believed that the "fundamental causes of the two world
wars lay in economic discrimination and trade warfare." 3 In classic eco-
nomic terms, such trade arrangements were "trade diverting' ' 4 and certainly
not "trade creating."'5 Interestingly enough, despite the negative effects of
regionalism, it was nevertheless suggested as the model plan for dealing with
the global problems after the war," but it was soon rejected for want of fa-
vor. 7 Even so, regionalism was not completely abolished, merely tabled. 8
Instead, what was eventually adopted was an international trade policy fo-
cused on building a "network of multilateral institutions to promote peace
and prosperity."' 9 And over the fifty years that followed, it was multilateral-
ism that shaped world affairs.'
For much of the world, especially developing and newly industrialized
economies (NIEs), multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) have been the fuel
behind the rapid economic expansion and integration of markets post World
War Il. It figured centrally in the reconstruction efforts of Europe and
Asia,2 and over the years, expanded trade liberalization, increased financial
stabilization and economic development under a framework of MTAs have
resulted in an increasingly interdependent world. With the advent of the
Cold War the search for a lasting peace to stave off war was stepped-up once
again, and the bi-polar Soviet-American conflict only reinforced global in-
12. Id. at 12.
13. GRABBE, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in support of the
official U.S. State Department position on abandoning isolationism once and for all to assume
center stage in world politics, most notably through greater international trade). The free trade
concerns and the understanding reached at the Bretton Woods conference would eventually
lead to the GATT in 1947. Id.
14. GORDON, supra note 4, at 14. In other words, the arrangements created less trade than
they diverted. Id.
15. TAKATOSHI ITO & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS 2 (1997). Unlike trade creation, which "can be expected to increase real in-
comes and benefit the members of the PTA without hurting the rest of the world, trade diver-
sion is costly to the importing country... and to the rest of the world." Id.
16. GORDON, supra note 4, at 1. This regional framework was outlined by British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill as early as 1942-43, and proposed a world divided into three "re-
gional councils"-Europe, the Pacific, and the Western hemisphere. Id.
17. Id. at 1. Supranational institutions were created instead, such as the United Nations
and the GATT. Id. at 13.
18. See generally GORDON, supra note 4.
19. Bello, supra note 8, at 88.
20. GORDON, supra note 4, at 1.
21. ITO& KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 1.
22. STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAWS, AND ISSUES 34 (1996). World War II left Europe and Asia in
political disarray and had leveled the economies of the regions. Id.
23. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (Anchor
Books 2000) (recognizing technology and the inter-connectedness of trade relations has led to
a highly interwoven and integrated globalized world).
2004]
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terdependence, or "globalization ' 4 as the answer to the world's ills." "Eco-
nomic growth in democratic countries became the transcendent international
goal" 6 as multilateralism became the hallmark of that goal, and U.S. interna-
tional economic policy the instrument of foreign policy." The U.S. emerged
not only as the leading superpower after the Cold War, but became the fore-
most proponent of using MTAs and multilateral institutions as the medium
by which to advance international trade as well as its own national security
interests."
However, multilateralism had hardly taken root when regionalism began
to reemerge once again in the international psyche. The successful formation
of the European Union (EU) as an integrated economic and unified trade
presence put Europe at the forefront of the trend toward regionalism. The
EU "inspired a reawakening of regionalist thinking everywhere."3 It altered
the course of international trade and upset the balance of bargaining power
under the existing GATT regime."
A. Why Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements
The international reaction to the formation of the EU is critical in two
respects: first, for every tactical action, there is an equal and opposite tactical
reaction; 32 and second, the EU regional bloc relies on Article 24 of the
GATT33 for legitimacy, suggesting that regionalism was never tabled in the
first place.
24. WORLD BANK, POVERTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, at http://www.worldbank.
org/economicpolicy/globalization/documentslpovertyglobalization.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2004). Summarized by the World Bank as "the global circulation of goods, services and capi-
tal, but also information, ideas and people." Id.
25. GORDON, supra note 4, at 1.
26. COHEN, supra note 22, at 34.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (1998). The
formation of the EU regional trading bloc was first initiated under the Single Market Initiative
in 1986-87. Id. The formation of the EU culminated in the implementation of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1992. See Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Future of
United States-European Community Trade Relations: The Consequences of Asymmetry in an
Emerging Era of Regionalism, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 489, 489 (1993).
30. GORDON, supra note 4, at 1.
31. See generally id. A coalition of countries sitting at the GATT bargaining table turns
the entire purpose of the GATT on its head. Id. The old clichd "strength in numbers" has be-
come the reason behind regional arrangements in an effort to level out the playing field at the
GATT negotiation table. Id.
32. To borrow from Sir Isaac Newton's Third Law of Motion, "for every action there is
an equal and opposite reaction." See Newton's Three Laws of Motion, available at
http://cseplO.phys.utk.edulastrl6l/lectlhistory/newton3laws.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
33. GORDON, supra note 4, at 13; see KRUEGER supra note 9, at 13. World Trade Organi-
zation, The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/lega e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXIV (last visited Mar.
26, 2003).
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1. Tactical Action meets Tactical Reaction
Countries consider a diverse range of objectives in contemplating or ne-
gotiating RTAs?' Yet despite the range in issues and considerations, they all
have one thread of commonality-strategy.
Some see trade agreements as providing underpinnings to strategic alli-
ances, and hence implicitly form part of security arrangements (as in
Europe). Smaller countries see trade agreements with larger partners as a
way of obtaining more security for their access to larger country markets
(as in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement [CUSTA]). Some countries
have tried to use regional (and multilateral) agreements to help lock in
domestic policy reform and make it more difficult to subsequently reverse
(Mexico in... NAFTA). Other countries' use of regional trade agree-
ments reflects tactical considerations; conscious efforts to use prior re-
gional agreements to influence subsequent multilateral negotiation.35
Strategic considerations in trade agreements (regional and multilateral)
are a constant reality in today's highly interdependent and globalized
world. 6 With inputs from one region being so intimately tied to outputs in
another, strategic alliances and related considerations control to a great ex-
tent." After all, exports relate directly to jobs, and "in the advanced and in-
dustrializing economies especially, those exports contribute significantly to
high-paying jobs."38 This, in turn, translates into an employed and tranquil
domestic economy. More than ever before, international trade is the nexus
and linchpin to a country's sustained economic vitality and its domestic po-
litical stability.39 In a very real way, regional trading blocs and RTAs
threaten to upset this balance because regional preferences discriminate
against non-member nations.' Accordingly, countries have not sat quies-
cently by but have answered the EU with a slew of RTAs of their own."'
B. U.S. Answers Regionalism with NAFTA
America's own answer to the call of regionalism began with the forma-
tion of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,42 later extended to include
Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
34. John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63 (1998). Much of the recent literature on re-
gionalism implicitly assumes that regional trade agreements are similar. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. GORDON, supra note 4, at 16.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 14.
41. FRANKEL, supra note 29, at 1.
42. Id. The U.S. abandoned its long-standing opposition to regionalism with the U.S.-
Canada FTA. Id.
2004] 305
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1993."' U.S. trade policy makers were fearful "that the national interest
would not be well served by playing the role of passive observer" while the
EU extended its preferential trading regime." Consequently, NAFTA has
been seen by many as "a defensive measure taken to compete with a feared
'Fortress Europe' ... the North American response to the European Un-
ion. ' 5 On the other hand, America was now prepared to negotiate its own
economic sphere of preference and influence in the Western Hemisphere so
as to maintain its command in world affairs.46
The U.S. decision to negotiate NAFTA signaled the emergence of a new
era of regionalism in international trading relations.'7 America's embrace of
RTAs as instrumental complements to its multilateral initiatives in interna-
tional trade is today, a complete and undeniable one. RTAs with the U.S.
serve to lock member nations into specific trading arrangements that are
beneficial to the U.S., guaranteeing open and unfettered access to foreign
markets while securing domestic policy reform in the foreign fora. ' These
RTAs often serve as leverage for the U.S. in influencing subsequent multi-
lateral agreements."
The economic benefits of the arrangements under NAFTA have also
been extremely fruitful. "Since 1994, trade between the United States, Can-
ada and Mexico has grown... [f]rom less than U.S.$297 billion in 1993" to
over U.S.$676 billion today, representing a trilateral trade growth of 128
percent "or more than U.S.$1.8 billion per day." '5 Investment among the
"three economies has also increased significantly, with total investment in
NAFTA countries reaching U.S.$1.3 trillion in 1999."'" According to the Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative, "[a]s a result of this growth
43. Abbot, supra note 29, at 489-90. NAFTA negotiations were formally concluded in
the same year that the EU's own 1992 European Economic Area agreement, which extended
its preferential trading through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and
the Lome countries, was implemented. See id. at 489.
44. Id.
45. W. GARY VAUSE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: THE
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA 65 (1997).
46. See id.
47. Id. As Vause seems to suggest, that was a significant turning point because up until
that time, countries had been compelled into multilateral arrangements, led largely by the
U.S.. Id. Access to the enormous U.S. market and other industrialized economies meant that
countries had to make certain concessions-GATTWTO accession being foremost among
them. Id. NAFTA was seen quite literally as the official 'green light' given by the U.S., sanc-
tioning an alternative to multilateralism. Id.
48. Whalley, supra note 34, at 63.
49. Id.
50. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Statement of the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission: Building on a North American Partnership (July 31, 2001), at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/07/01-59.htm.
51. Id.
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in trade and investment, millions of jobs have been created in all three coun-
tries."52
We reaffirmed our strong support for further regional and multilateral
trade liberalization, and noted the important role that regional co-
operation, such as NAFTA, can play in stimulating further multilateral
trade liberalization. In this context, we agreed to cooperate amongst our-
selves in other regional and global fora, such as the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FrAA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO).53
The U.S. policies on behalf of regionalism to date have helped legiti-
mize the environment for similar actions by other nations. Flush from the
success of NAFIA, the U.S. is currently leading the way in the creation of
the world's largest free market-the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FrAA).' Under the FTAA, the U.S. will eliminate duties on consumer and
industrial goods from the hemisphere." The U.S. also intends to extend the
duty-free status to U.S. imports of textiles and apparel from FTAA countries
within five years, provided the F1'AA countries reciprocate.56 "Immediate
elimination of tariffs... in key sectors such as chemicals, construction and
mining equipment, electrical equipment, energy products, environmental
products, information technology, medical equipment, non-woven fabric,
paper, steel and wood products" will take place under the agreement, and
market access to the U.S. investment and services sector will be broadly ac-
cessible.'
The implications of a Western hemisphere-wide regional bloc are still
unclear. However, with each successive step the U.S. takes towards con-
summating the FTAA, the U.S. continues to drive a divisive wedge between
the economies of the different hemispheres, "the hardening of world politics
into three regional blocs-in Europe, East Asia, and the Americas."58
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade Area of the Americas:
The Opportunity for a Hemispheric Marketplace (Feb. 11, 2003), available at
http:/www.ustr.gov/regions/whenisphere/ftaa2002/2003-02-1 -tradefacts-english.PDF. The
FTAA will have a combined GDP of nearly $13 trillion, encompassing 34 countries, and
nearly 800 million consumers stretching all the way from Alaska to the tip of South America.
Id.
55. Id. (This will apply to those consumer and industrial goods not already covered by
NAFTA.).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. GORDON, supra note 4, at 3. "[A] 1994 study of 'NAFTA's Impact on Japan,' pub-
lished by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington .... [reported] "that NAFTA's short-
term consequences for Japan were negligible, but 'if the U.S. moves to enlarge NAFTA into
[FTAA]... it could pose serious problems for Japan."' Id. at 114. The danger is that Asian
regionalism will be strengthened if large-scale trade and investment diversion occurs. See id.
at 114. From what Gordon points out, it seems clear that should the U.S. continue in its efforts
to form a regional bloc of the Americas, such an effort would only serve to further polarize
30720041
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C. Asia-Pacific
Concern among the Asian leaders and others was first aroused in the
early 1990s when the U.S. announced plans to form NAFTA." Those con-
cerns were significantly heightened when subsequent to the formation of
NAIFTA, the first President Bush, and then President Clinton, began to talk
of a hemispheric bloc, extending NAFTA to the FTAA.' Their fears were
threefold: first, South Americans would get preferential treatment in the ex-
tensive U.S. market as a result of the FTAA; second, those preferences
would come at Asia's expense;6 and third, it would result in an Asian re-
gional bloc. 2 These fears finally found confirmation in the U.S. reaction to
the Asian currency crisis of 1997.3 Asian nations were now ready to pull
away.
1. The Asian Currency Crisis of 1997-98
The devaluation of the Thai Baht" sent the Thai economy spiraling
downward, and money began to pull out of the entire region.' Global mar-
relations between the U.S. and Asia collectively. See id. at 114-19. The end result would be
factions comprised of the EU, the FTAA and an Asian regional bloc that will very likely be
led by Japan. Id.
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id.
61. Id. The worry was that the trade diverting effects of the FTAA would result in more
import of goods from FTAA member nations instead of the Asia-Pacific nations. Id. One only
has to look at the list of goods, such as textiles, chemicals, and information technology
equipment, within the sectors that the U.S. intends to eliminate duties under the FTAA, to see
that there is significant crossover with Asia. Id
62. GORDON, supra note 4, at 14. Japan's Finance Minister was quoted as follows in
1991 in response to the question whether Japan would join the Malaysian proposal for a "cau-
cus" of Asian nations that would exclude the U.S.:
As a member of the cabinet I do not highly regard the Mahathir Plan. But if the
United States strengthens its posture towards forming a protectionist bloc by ex-
tending NAFTA and closing off South America and North America, then Japan
will have to emphasize its position as an Asia-Pacific country. This will inevitably
alter the Japan-U.S. relationship.., so please do not force us into such a comer.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Private institutions in Europe, Japan and America had made huge loans to primarily
private Thai enterprises during the heyday of the Asian economic growth of the early to mid
1990s. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at xi. Additionally, the Thai Baht was pegged to the
U.S. dollar, and as the Thai economy weakened, investor confidence waned. Id. People began
to wonder if there were enough U.S. dollars to cover the exchange with the baht and began
pulling out U.S. dollars. See id. at xi-xii. As Thailand began to dip further and further into
their foreign reserves to bolster their currency, the problem hit a crescendo. Id. With no for-
eign reserves, a looming foreign debt of enormous proportions, and a devalued currency, the
Thai economy folded. Id. See generally Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World
Economy (PBS television broadcast, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/ command-
ingheights/lo/story/tr..menu_03.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Commanding
Heights].
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kets equated the problem in Thailand with the surrounding NIEs." Suddenly,
Thailand's neighboring countries' economies were facing a similar free fall,
as their currencies and stock markets bottomed out with the massive flight of
capital from the area. 7 The domino effect was spreading faster than most had
predicted and something had to be done to stem the flow.
2. Japan Volunteers to Step In Where the U.S. Fails to Help
In the immediate wake of the Thai currency crisis, the Asian Finance
Ministers held an emergency meeting where Japan proposed an "Asian
Monetary Fund" (AMF) that would help with the bailout plan." This pro-
posal was flatly rejected by the U.S. at the annual meetings of the G-7 Fi-
nance Ministers, the IMF, and the World Bank later that year.' The defeat of
the AMF proposal "significantly soured U.S. dealings with Thailand."7 As a
consequence, the U.S. was slow in moving to make relief funds available for
use, resulting in speculation that the U.S. had intentionally chosen to ignore
the growing problems in Asia.7' As if to exacerbate tensions, the U.S. then
promptly turned up with $55 billion in new loans and credits to help bailout
Korea just three months later, when the financial crisis eventually spread
there. To many in the region now plagued with financial woes, it seemed as
if "the Americans had not taken the Asian crisis seriously until Korea, a very
close U.S. military ally, also got into financial trouble."73 Asia was "furious
at the U.S. failure to help" during the critical stages of the crisis, and in-
censed that the U.S. would jump in only when its immediate interests were
at stake.74 Japan's "quick and generous AMF offer" stood in stark contrast to
the fatally slow U.S. response to Asia's troubles,7" and at the end of the day,
65. Commanding Heights, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. GORDON, supra note 4, at 114-15. Japan was of the opinion that "in a case like Thai-
land, where $20-$30 billion... might be needed, IMF resources might be insufficient...
[and] too cumbersome." Id. at 115. A regional facility to which resources would already have
been committed would allow those resources to be disbursed more quickly and with fewer
restrictions. Id.
69. Id. The U.S. argued that an AMF would needlessly complicate, or rather, compete
with the IMF's global role and could "create problems of 'moral hazard': the prospect that
borrowers would delay putting their fiscal houses in order... [if] they believed additional
funds could come from non-IMF sources." Id.
70. Id. at 116.
71. Id. In part, this was due to Congress' feet-dragging after the problems they had ex-
perienced with the Mexican bailout only two years earlier. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 118.
2004]
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the Asian crisis resulted in much acrimony, a revival of anti-American sen-
timents in the region, and a renewed interest in Asian regionalism."
3. The Costs of U.S. Non-Participation in Asia
The U.S. has since repeatedly declined to take any position whatsoever
on the issue, and has treated the matter with great aplomb, even in the face
of scathing criticism and remarks from Asia. Many saw Washington's slow
response as deliberate, a "calculated policy" to undermine the region's re-
markable growth." Critics posited that America was racist, anti-Asian even,
and had sought the crisis as a means to recover from its huge trade deficits
with many countries in the region."8
During this period, the U.S., instead of mending relations with Asia, fo-
cused on its progress under NAFTA and diverted exports previously bound
for Asia to Canada and Mexico. In 1998, the importance of NAFTA markets
to the U.S. grew dramatically, as U.S. agricultural exports to Asia decreased
as a result of the economic crisis. America's economy grew dramatically."'
"While Japan purchased U.S.$1.4 billion less in 1998, and exports to South-
east Asia fell U.S.$900 million, exports to Canada and Mexico rose 10 per-
cent, or about U.S.$1.2 billion.""0 U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico in-
creased 17 percent in 1997,81 which almost doubled the total rate of export
growth, and increased 5 percent in 1998,82 while U.S. exports to the Pacific
Rim countries fell 14 percent (or U.S.$26 billion) during that same year.83
This may have helped the U.S. protect "tens of thousands of American
jobs[,]"' but it may have come at too steep a price.
The U.S. cannot afford to continue ignoring its estranged relationship
with Asia. With the U.S. exporting around U.S.$200 billion a year to the re-
gion," America has much to gain by smoothing over relations and working
on greater economic cooperation with Asian countries. Add to that the real-
ity that the U.S. is actually "geographically[,] a very large and major Asia-
Pacific nation, ' '16 with its 1500-mile-long west coast-stretching from Cali-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 117.
78. Id.
79. Office of the United States Trade Representative, NAFTA Overview, at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/overview.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
Between 1993 and 1998, agricultural exports to Mexico grew from $3.6 billion to $6.2 billion
while in 1998 the sales to Canada increased from $5.3 billion to over $7 billion. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (a growth of U.S.$12 billion).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. GORDON, supra note 4, at 136. This accounts for twenty-five to thirty percent of its
total exports. Id.
86. Id. at 135.
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fornia to Washington-home to an increasingly Asian ethnic population, 7 it
becomes all the more imperative that the U.S. foster relations in the region.
Conversely, this is true for the Asia-Pacific countries as well. "When we turn
the coin over, and consider Asia's likely perspectives towards the U.S., we
find that the American role as an importer of Asia's goods is no less impor-
tant.""8 In 1998, the U.S. imported about U.S.$230 billion from the Asian na-
tions."' That accounted for almost twenty-five percent of the U.S.'s world-
wide imports.'
D. Singapore
Singapore sits in the heart of the Asia-Pacific and is the gateway to East
and West Asia.9 Singapore is an export-oriented economy and is highly de-
pendent on international trade, sale of services and export of manufactures.9'
A "free trader," Singapore places almost no barriers to the free flow of goods
in and out of its borders, and is a "vocal champion of global free trade."'93
Not surprisingly, Singapore leads the Asia-Pacific region in FTAs and has
already signed- four FTAs,94 not including the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA).9
Over the last decade, Singapore and the U.S. have become significant
trading partners. Singapore is the second largest Asian investor in the U.S.
after Japan,' and is "America's 1 1"' largest trading partner, with two-way
87. Id.
88. Id. at 138.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See generally Encarta, Republic of Singapore, available at http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_761559956/SingaporeRepublicpf.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004)
92. GORDON, supra note 4, at 138.
93. Ministry of Trade and Industry, Free Trade Agreement, at http://www.mti.gov.sg/
public/FTA/frm FTA_Default.asp?sid=12&cid=888 (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
94. The Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partner-
ship (ANZSCEP) in 2000, ANZSCEP, International Enterprise Singapore, at http://www.
iesingapore.gov.sg/markets/index.jsp?vert=VA&secfield=6&catfield=109 (last visited Apr.
1, 2004). Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in 2002. JSEPA, Inter-
national Enterprise Singapore, at http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/markets/index.j
sp?vert=VA&secfield=6&catfield=110 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). EFTA-Singapore Free
Trade Area in 2002, EFTA, International Enterprise Singapore, at http://www. iesinga-
pore.gov.sg/markets/index.jsp?vert=VA&secfield=6&catfield=l 11 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2003, SAFTA, International Enter-
prise Singapore, at http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/markets/index.jsp?vert=VA& secfield=
6&catfield= 112 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). Singapore is also currently negotiating FTAs with
Canada, Mexico and Korea. Singapore FTAs, International Enterprise Singapore, at
http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/markets/index.jsp?vert=VA&secfield=6&catfield=l 14 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2004).
95. What is an FTA?, International Enterprise Singapore, at http://www.iesingapore.
gov.sg/markets/index.jsp?vert=VA&secfield=6&catfield=106 (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
96. Information Paper on the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), at
http://www.usembassysingapore.org.sg/U.S._Singapore/2002/Information%2Paper%20on%
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goods and services trade of $38.8 billion in 2001." U.S. exports of private
commercial services to Singapore totaled $4.1 billion in 2001,98 up 54%
from 1994, while U.S. imports were $2.0 billion." U.S. foreign direct in-
vestment in Singapore was $27.3 billion in 2001, up 6.5% from $25.6 billion
in 2 00 0 ."m U.S. investment in Singapore accounts for 60% of total U.S.
manufacturing investment in all of Southeast Asia.' Not surprisingly, the
U.S. is one of the most important trading and investment partners for Singa-
pore." With 1,300 U.S. companies and 15,000 U.S. citizens in Singapore,
Singapore is a natural base in the Asia-Pacific from which U.S. multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) can export throughout the world."03
In 2002, President Clinton and Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong first announced plans to begin negotiations for a comprehensive bilat-
eral FTA between the nations that would significantly lower existing tariffs
and provide for a greater trade of services. The failure of the Seattle WTO
meeting in 1999 had prompted many countries-including Singapore-to
reassess their positions and strategically augment the existing multilateral
approach with bilateral FIAs, at least with key trading partners."°
On January 15, 2003, "the U.S. Treasury and the Monetary Authority of
Singapore reached agreement on issues affecting transfers in the investment
chapter of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement."'' Both countries rec-
ognized "that a strong reserve position, a flexible exchange rate regime,
sound fiscal and monetary policies, and effective prudential measures for the
financial sector are the preferred policy tools for both avoiding a balance of
payments crisis and for dealing with one."'"
(last accessed Dec. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Paper].
97. United States Trade Representative, Free Trade With Singapore: America's First
Free Trade Agreement in Asia, available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/2002-12-
13-singapore-facts.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) [hereinafter USTR].
98. United States Trade Representative, 2003 National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers: Singapore, available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/ nte/2003/singapore.
pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Report] (this is the most recent data available).
99. Id.
100. Id. U.S. investment in Singapore is concentrated largely in manufacturing, finance,
and petroleum. Id.
101. Excerpts from the Trade Advisory Committee Reports, U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/ac-excerpts.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,
2003).
102. Paper, supra note 96. The U.S. is Singapore's second largest trading partner and is
her largest foreign direct investor. Id.
103. Id.
104. d
105. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Singapore Reach Agreement on In-
vestment Protections in Free Trade Talks (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http:Ilwww. treas-
ury.gov/press/releases/kd3766.htm.
106. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Agreement on U.S.-Singapore Free Trans-
fers (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/kd
37661 .doc.
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II. THE USSFTA
A. Trade in Goods
"With the exception of four tariff lines covering beer and certain alco-
holic beverages, Singapore imposes no tariffs on imported goods."'" Thus
the provisions under Article 2 governing the trade in goods are not much by
way of major concessions from Singapore."8 However, it is nevertheless
relevant to note that under the USSFTA, both parties are to "accord national
treatment to the goods of the other party,"'" and Singapore is to eliminate all
customs duties upon entry into force of the USSFTA." ° Singapore shall not
adopt or maintain any export tax on originating goods to the U.S."' nor im-
plement any import restrictions for goods originating from the U.S."2 To
qualify as an originating good, the good must be "wholly obtained or pro-
duced entirely in the territory of one or both of the Parties,""' 3 meet the prod-
uct-specific rules of origin under Annex "" or otherwise be provided as an
originating good under Article 3.15 For goods that do not undergo a "change
in tariff classification" under Annex I, as long as "the value of all non-
originating materials used in the production of the good ... does not exceed
10 percent of the adjusted value of the good," and it otherwise meets all
qualifying criteria as an originating good, it will be considered an originating
107. Report, supra note 98, 342. "These four remaining tariffs have been eliminated for
trade within the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and for trade with New Zealand, Japan, and the
European Free Trade Association." Id. Singapore will likewise eliminate these tariffs under
the USSFTA. Id. "However, for social and/or environmental reasons Singapore levies high
excise taxes on distilled spirits and wine, tobacco products, motor vehicles (all of which are
imported), and gasoline." Id. Under Article 2.9 of the USSFTA "Singapore shall harmonize
its excise taxes on imported and domestic distilled spirits" in stages, which is to be completed
by 2005. United States Trade Representative, United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
Article 2.9, available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/ftalSingapore/final/2004-0l-15-final.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter USSFTA].
108. See Report, supra note 98, at 342.
109. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 2.1.
110. Id. art. 2.2, 1.
111. Id. art. 2.4.
112. Id. art. 2.7. As a side note, "Singapore restricts the importation and use of satellite
receiving dishes" and has prohibited the installation and operation of satellite receiving dishes
and similar apparatus under Part VI of the Broadcasting Act. Report, supra note 98, at 344.
Article 2.10 effectively eliminates this import prohibition and states that the parties may not
maintain an import ban on any broadcasting apparatus, including satellite dishes. USSFTA,
supra note 107, art. 2.10. On a humorous note, Singapore's outright ban on chewing gum in
the country has finally seen its last slack-jawed days. Report, supra note 98, at 342. Supply
lines may soon be opened with the implementation of Article 2.11, under which Singapore is
to allow the importation of "chewing gum with therapeutic value" for sale and supply in the
country. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 2.11.
113. Id. art. 3.1(a).
114. Id. art. 3.1(b). The parties are to meet within six months after the Agreement has
been entered into force to discuss the expansion of the product coverage of Annex I.
115. Id. art. 3.1(c).
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good."' "The Singapore Government does not directly subsidize exports.""'
However, it does offer significant export-oriented incentives to attract for-
eign investment and also offers grants to new service suppliers."'
With respect to government procurement in Singapore, it is generally
considered free and open."9 Under the USSFTA, Singapore will reaffirm its
commitment to free, open and transparent government procurement and will
continue to observe its obligations under the GPA relating to products'20 and
services.' U.S. firms will gain greater nondiscriminatory access under the
agreement.
B. Trade in Services
"Singapore will accord substantial market access across its entire ser-
vices regime, subject to very few exceptions."'' The USSFTA will liberalize
cross-border trade in services by extending national and Most-Favored-
Nation (MFN) treatment to the service providers of each party.' Cross-
border trade in services is defined under the agreement as the supply of a
service moving from one party's territory into the territory of the other party
or the supply of a service within a party's territory provided by a person of
that territory to the other party.'" Neither party is permitted to control or
limit market access by imposing restrictions that limit the number of service
providers, the total value of services, the total output, or the number of em-
ployees to be hired in a given service sector.' Service providers of the par-
ties are not required to establish a presence within the other party's territory
to enjoy the right to provide services.""2 The parties are entitled to set forth
those measures that have been specifically exempt from some or all of the
obligations imposed under the agreement, and may continue discriminatory
116. Id. art. 3.3, 1.
117. Report, supra note 98, at 343.
118. Id.
119. Id. "However, some U.S. firms have expressed concerns that government-owned
and government-linked companies (GLCs) may receive preferential treatment in the govern-
ment procurement process[,]" which the Singapore Government strongly denies. Id. "Singa-
pore has been a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) since 1997"
and has reaffirmed all obligations under the GPA in signing the USSFTA. Id.
120. Id. For the full list of covered products, see GPA Appendix 1, Annex 1, available at
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-.elgproc-e/singl.doc (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
121. Report, supra note 98, at 343. For the full list of covered services, see GPA Appen-
dix 1, Annex 4, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproc-e/sing4.doc (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2004).
122. USTR, supra note 97.
123. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 8.4.
124. id. art 8.1. This does not cover the supply of a service by an investor or an invest-
ment, which is dealt with under Chapter 15, id. art. 8.2, nor the supply of financial services
covered under Chapter 10. id. art. 8.3(a).
125. Id. art. 8.5.
126. ld. art. 8.6.
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measures within those particular sectors identified in an annex to the agree-
ment. 27 Under the agreement, air transportation services are excluded from
liberalization commitments.' Among the more prominent of Singapore's
reservations from liberalization commitments are certain investment ser-
vices, 29 the postal and telecommunications sectors, the power sector, trans-
port and cargo handling services sector, and the devolution of certain public
sectors. 3 All transfers and payments resulting from cross-border trade in
services are protected from restrictions on transferability and are "to be made
freely and without delay into and out of its territory.''
1. Financial and Banking Services
Prior to 1999, new licenses for local retail banking had not been issued
in Singapore for over two decades to either foreign or domestic institutions
because the Monetary Authority of Singapore had considered its banking
sector to be saturated.' Furthermore, "existing foreign banks in Singapore
were not allowed to open new branches, freely relocate existing branches, or
operate off-premise Automated Teller Machines (ATMs)."'33 The Singapore
Government began easing restrictions under a banking liberalization pro-
gram in 1999,' and has since "removed the 40 percent ceiling on foreign
ownership of local banks and granted 'qualifying full bank' (QFB) licenses
to six foreign banks."'35 Despite the "liberalization, foreign banks in the do-
mestic retail banking sector still face significant restrictions and are not ac-
corded national treatment."'36 The number of foreign QFBs is strictly limited
and foreign banks are still not allowed access to the local ATM networks.'37
Some foreign charge card issuers face similar problems and even their local
cardholders cannot access their accounts through the local ATM networks.'
127. Id. art. 8.7; see also id. annexes 8A, 8B.
128. Id. art. 8.2(3). However, the USSFTA does include aircraft maintenance and repair
while an aircraft is withdrawn from service, and it includes specialty air services, defined as
any non-transportation air services such as aerial firefighting, sightseeing, spraying, survey-
ing, mapping, etc. See id. arts. 8.1, 8.2(3).
129. See generally USSFTA, supra note 107, chap. 15.
130. See generally id. annex 8C.
131. Id. art. 8.10.
132. Report, supra note 98, at 345.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 345-46.
135. Id. at 346. QFB licenses allow "banks to operate up to 15 customer services loca-
tions (branches or off-premise ATMs), up to ten of which can be branches; to relocate freely
existing branches; and to share ATMs among themselves[;]... provide electronic funds
transfer, point-of-sale debit services, accept Central Provident Fund (CPF) fixed deposits; and
provide" retirement investment accounts. Id.
136. Id. at 346.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Under the USSFTA, parties will accord substantial market access and
extend the rights of national and MFN treatment to the financial service pro-
viders of each party, subject to a few reservations.' 3 The limit on QFB privi-
leges to six foreign banks will be lifted for U.S. banks within eighteen
months of entry into force of the agreement.'" QFBs will be able to offer
their services at up to thirty customer service locations in the first year, and
at an unlimited number of locations within two years."" The limit on whole-
sale banks that serve only large transactions will likewise be lifted for U.S.
banks within three years of entry-into-force. 2 However, under the Singapore
reservations, wholesale banks are still not permitted to: (a) accept less than
$250,000 of fixed deposits; (b) offer savings accounts; (c) operate interest-
bearing current accounts in Singapore dollars for natural persons who are
Singapore residents; and (d) issue Singapore dollar bonds and negotiable
certificates of deposit unless the requirements contained in the Guidelines
for Operation for Whole Sale Banks issued by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore are complied with.' 3 The current restriction on access to the local
ATM network will be lifted under the USSFTA and locally incorporated
U.S. QFBs can apply for access to the network within two years and six
months of implementation of the agreement.'" Non-locally incorporated U.S.
QFBs can gain access within four years of implementation.' 5
C. Investments
"Singapore has a generally open investment regime, and no overarching
screening process for foreign investment."'" There are "no restrictions on re-
investment or repatriation of earnings and capital."'4 7 In this respect, the
USSFTA will not only reinforce Singapore's commitment to an open in-
vestments environment but also will also "provide a secure, predictable legal
framework for U.S. investors operating in Singapore."'4 8 Under the agree-
ment, each party is to accord the investors of the other nation and their cov-
139. USSFTA, supra note 107, arts. 10.2, 10.3. See id. art. 10.4 (parties cannot impose
restrictions on market access such as limits on the number of financial institutions, the total
value of services transactions or assets, the number of employees, etc). See also id. art. 10.8
(parties may not require the hire of local professionals for senior management or director
positions nor determine the composition of local professionals on the boards).
140. USTR, supra note 97, at 2.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Report, supra note 98, at 346.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 347. "Singapore's legal framework and public policies are intended to be for-
eign investor-friendly." Id. However, "Singapore maintains limits on foreign investment in
broadcasting, the news media, domestic retail banking, property ownership, and in some gov-
ernment-linked companies." ld.
147. Id.
148. USTR, supra note 97, at 4.
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ered investments the better of national treatment or MFN treatment.149 This
treatment must, at a minimum, meet the standard of customary international
law, 5 including principles of fair and equitable treatment, and full protec-
tion and security of covered investments.'' "Fair and equitable treatment"
under the agreement affords U.S. investors their due process rights, while
the obligation between the parties to provide "full protection and security"
guarantees that police protection will be provided in compliance with the
standard required by customary international law for all covered invest-
ments. "'3 Covered investments include all assets directly or indirectly owned
or controlled by an investor that have the characteristics of an investment,
including the commitment of capital, the expectation of gain or profit, or the
assumption of risk."' All covered investments are protected from expropria-
tion or nationalization, 55 and investors are guaranteed the right to compensa-
tion in an amount equal to the fair market value of the investment asset prior
to the date of expropriation,'56 plus a commercially reasonable rate of inter-
est. 
57
The investor rights guaranteed under this chapter are backed by impar-
tial investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and capital control provi-
sions.5 Under the USSFTA, the parties will initially submit to consultation
and negotiation in an attempt to resolve all disputes, 5 and may elect binding
arbitration procedures in the event that consultation and negotiation prove
unfruitful."w All dispute settlement procedures are fully transparent under the
149. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 15.4(4).
150. id. art 15.5(2). "[T]he customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens [is prescribed] as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered in-
vestments." Id.
151. Id. "The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security'
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required [under the minimum
standard of customary international law] and do not create additional substantive rights." Id.
art. 15.5(2).
152. Id. art. 15.5(2)(a). It "includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings." Id.
153. Id. art. 15.5(2)(b).
154. Id. art. 15.1. Where an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, that asset is
not an investment regardless of the form it may take. Id. at n.15-1. Recognized forms of in-
vestment include: an enterprise; shares, stock and other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise; bonds, debentures and debt instruments and loans; futures, options and other de-
rivatives; turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing and
other similar contracts; intellectual property rights; licenses, authorizations, permits, and simi-
lar rights conferred pursuant to applicable domestic law; and other tangible or intangible,
movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens,
and pledges. Id. art. 15.1(13), n. 15-1 to 15-3.
155. Id. art. 15.6(1).
156. Id. art. 15.6(2)(b).
157. Id. art. 15.6(3).
158. USTR, supra note 97, at 5.
159. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 15.14.
160. Id. art. 15.15. Investors or parties with unresolved disputes may submit their claims
under the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, id.
2004]
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USSFTA"6' and parties have a right to public panel hearings where interested
parties will have an opportunity to submit their views. 62
E. Competition Policy
"Singapore does not have an umbrella competition law, although the
Singapore Government has specific competition regulations governing the
telecommunications, finance, and power sectors, and is in the process of
drafting a broader law."'6  Under the USSFTA, pursuant to the provisions
under Chapter 12, Singapore commits to enact general domestic competition
legislation by 2005,"u proscribing all anti-competitive trade and commercial
practices of local enterprises in order to ensure that U.S. firms will not be
discriminated against in the course of commercial conduct and trade. 65 Such
legislation is to cover the practices of government enterprises as well.' Fur-
thermore, Singapore is to create a competition commission by that date to
enforce the newly enacted legislation. 67 Note, however, that nothing under
the agreement prevents either party from designating a monopoly. 68
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE USSFTA
The USSFTA is a groundbreaking agreement and should be ratified un-
der the Trade Promotion Authority. First, it is a win-win agreement for the
parties because both have much to gain by its adoption. Next, it bodes well
for the U.S. to bridge relations with the Asia-Pacific by signing a bilateral
agreement with a leading Asian country. Lastly, the major objectives of
Congress are met under the agreement.
The USSFTA is a win-win agreement for both parties and certainly
represents an increased commitment to building closer economic relations
between the two countries." For Singapore, the concerns of being left out of
the enormous U.S. market in the wake of NAFTA, and especially in the face
of FTAA negotiations, will be significantly assuaged with the adoption and
art. 15.15(5)(a); the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, id. art. 15.15(3)(b); or under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, id. art.
15.15(3)(c). See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org/icsidIbasicdoc/partA.htm.
161. See USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 15.20.
162. Id.
163. Report, supra note 98, at 347.
164. USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 12.2(1) n. 12-1.
165. Id. art. 12.2(1).
166. Id. art. 12.2(1) n. 12-1.
167. Id. art. 12.2(2).
168. Id. art. 12.3(l)(a).
169. See generally Paper, supra note 96.
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ratification of this agreement.'70 This agreement is also a major coup for Sin-
gapore as it will be the first Asian nation to sign an RTA with the United
States, thus ending five years of U.S. reticence in trade with the Asia-Pacific,
post financial crisis. For the U.S., currently the largest exporter to Singapore,
the USSFTA "will substantially improve market access ... for American in-
dustrial and other non-agricultural goods and particularly for services[." 7'
The Investments Chapter of the agreement provides rights consistent with
U.S. law and guarantees a fully transparent dispute settlement process, open
to the public, where parties will have input." Prior to the initiation of FTA
negotiations with Singapore, the U.S. had been concerned that it could lose
market share in Singapore, especially in services trade, as a result of the
multiple FTAs Singapore has recently been ratifying and negotiating.'73
Thus, the agreement provided an opportunity for the U.S. to solidify the par-
ties' symbiotic economic relationship. "A robust agreement with Singapore,
the most free-trade-oriented country in the region, sets a high standard for
other agreements and encourages significant trade liberalization in the re-
gion. ,74
It is also relevant to note that unlike NAFTA, which was wrought with
environmental and labor concerns and side agreements, '71 the USSFTA has
integrated environmental issues as part of the core text, representing a sig-
nificant accomplishment as far as RTAs go. 'The [a]greement fully meets
the environmental objectives set out by Congress in TPA," the Trade Act of
2002.176 However, the provisions in the agreement then fall flat as it merely
provides that the parties will effectively enforce their own domestic envi-
ronmental law and that they will strive for "high levels of protection" with-
out defining what those levels are or how they will be enforced.
77
While the provisions in the agreement do achieve several milestones in
terms of greater accessibility and fairness in trade and commerce, it is
important to note that the reservations Singapore lists in its Annex to the
Chapter In Trade in Services are still the same industries it has been fiercely
protecting all these years, industries such as the postal and
telecommunications sectors, certain financial service and banking sectors,
and the power industry. Singapore has given no signs that it is willing to
170. See generally GORDON, supra note 4.
171. U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Excerpts from Trade Advisory Committee
Reports (quoting the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN)), at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/ac-excerpts.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Excerpts].
172. Id. (quoting ISAC 13 - Services)
173. Id. (quoting from ACTPN). The U.S. was most notably concerned about Singa-
pore's agreement with Japan, China, Canada and Korea. Id. See also Ministry of Trade and
Industry, supra note 93.
174. Excerpts, supra note 171 (quoting from ACTPN).
175. See generally A.L.C. de Mestral, The Significance of the NAFTA Side Agreements
on Environmental and Labour Cooperation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. LAW 169 (1998).
176. USTR, supra note 97, at 8.
177. Id. See also USSFTA, supra note 107, art. 18.1.
2004]
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try. Singapore has given no signs that it is willing to liberalize these indus-
tries."' As a result, there is a significant irony in the interplay between con-
cessions and reservations: telecommunication devices such as satellite dishes
are now allowed for import, yet the services to support the use are strictly
controlled by the Government;'79 U.S. banks will be allowed greater presence
and access to the local ATM network, but access is not to be granted imme-
diately and then only by application;"w Singapore is to draw up legislation
proscribing all anti-competition, yet it reserves the right to keep some mo-
nopolies. 8 '
It is also significant to note that the Labor Advisory Committee for
Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC) is of the opinion that the
USSFTA actually fails to meet the objectives set by Congress under the
TPA. According to the LAC, the agreement "fails to meet some congres-
sional negotiating objectives, barely complies with others, and includes
some provisions that are not based on any congressional negotiating objec-
tives at all."'8 The USSFTA repeats the mistakes of NAFTA and is "likely
to lead to the same deteriorating trade balances, lost jobs, trampled rights,
and inadequate economic development that NAFTA has created,"'83 and will
not protect the core rights of Singapore workers or U.S. workers. While
there are counter reports of the impact on labor,"8' and despite the fact that
both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to the standards of the In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work,' there are legitimate concerns among workers of both
the U.S. and Singapore. U.S. workers fear a repeat of the NAFTA labor
problems under the USSFTA, resulting in the loss of even more manufactur-
ing jobs as companies relocate overseas.8 6 The workers in Singapore are
likewise skeptical of the benefits under the USSFTA, fearful that the coun-
try's top professional jobs will now go to U.S. professionals who are often
better paid yet equally qualified. Despite these labor fears, any asymmetry
will eventually even out due in large part to the fact that both economies are
highly similar and very compatible in terms of skill, costs, technology and
comparative advantages. Furthermore, while over the short term, the move-
178. USSFTA, supra note 107, annex 8C (no phase out date included).
179. See generally Report, supra note 98, at 344.
180. Id. at 346.
181. See generally id.
182. The U.S. -Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Report of the Labor Advisory Commit-
tee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC), 3, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/
fta/Singapore/ac-lac.pdf (Feb. 28, 2003).
183. Id. at 16.
184. See Excerpts, supra note 171 (quoting the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC)).
185. Id. See generally ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
186. Manufacturing will likely not relocate to Singapore as the labor costs there are quite
high as well, but will however, relocate to Bintan Island of Indonesia, with whom Singapore
has an FTA and under which, the island is considered part of the 'Singapore territory' for
purposes of manufacturing and rules of origin.
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ment in labor may be disproportionate or disruptive to the domestic labor
market, over the long run such migration patterns would be minimized.
IV. CONCLUSION
The USSFTA carries with it implications of greater regional harmony
and economic cooperation than just another RTA. The success of the
USSFTA will determine the vitality and health of the U.S. international
markets in Asia and what role it will continue to play in international poli-
tics, most notably, the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. As
the U.S. concentrates on building a unified Western hemisphere, it has to be
ever mindful of who it is walling in for preferential treatment as much as
who it is walling out as a consequence. Economic retaliation and trade war-
fare can be costly between hemispheric factions and half a century of work
under multilateralism hangs in the balance. The USSFTA will open more
doors than it will close and should be ratified by Congress under the current
Trade Promotion Authority.
Sherrillyn S. Lim*
J.D. candidate, April 2004, California Westernn School of Law; B.A. International
Business, May 1999, San Diego State University. Thank you to the U.S. and Singaporean
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Appendix A
Regional Integration Agreements Notified to GATTIWTO and in Force as of January 1995
Reciprocal Regional Integration Agreements
Europe
European Community (EC)
Austria Germany
Belgium Greece
Denmark Ireland
Finland Italy
France Luxembourg
EC FTAs with
Estonia Latvia
Iceland Liechtenstein
Israel Lithuania
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Norway
Switzerland
EC association agreements with
Bulgaria Hungary Romania
Cyprus Malta Slovak Rep.
Czech Rep. Poland Turkey
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
Iceland Norway Switzerland
Liechtenstein
EFTA free trade agreements with
Bulgaria Israel Slovak Rep.
Czech Rep. Poland Turkey
Hungary Romania
Norway free trade agreements with
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Switzerland free trade agreements with
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Czech Rep. and Slovak Rep. Customs Union
Central European Free Trade Area
Czech Rep. Poland Slovak Rep.
Hungary
Czech Rep. and Slovenia Free Trade Agreement
North America
Canada-US FrA (CUFTA)
NAFTA
Latin America & the Caribbean
Caribbean Community and Common Market
(Caricom)
Central American Common Market
(CACM)
Latin American Integration Association
(LAIA)
Andean Pact
Southern Common Market (Mercosur)
Middle East
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Asia
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relationship (CER)
Bangkok Agreement
Common Effective Preferential Scheme for
the ASEAN Free Trade Area
Lao People's Dem. Rep. and Thailand Trade
Agreement
Other
Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
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Slovak Rep. and Slovenia Free Trade Agreement
Relonal Trad A mnt Notified to the GATTTO= and In Force
By dat of w o t  force
As of 24 Januaiy 2003
EC (Trety of Rome) l.,lan481O.lv. OATS At V I ::rMWO uue a= u90*4ft
2;an, 4-pr-67 OGATT lXXtV 1u L RItaod1d 29.11.57
EFTA (Stockholm AlarpW 144bo 1 Free Wade WS/REG80 Raoted
Convention) ___4-_____ 0VR8o d O
.K-M 12.006124&Feb.6 GATT Art)00N c WT/:EG93 Rep ftaM de MM
TIPARflTE 14-48 Emf Muse w LA290 1M3LOW8Add.1 od 14.11.
Acmsdo t LMd2 10 174
EFTAiccan of Icwu 14.W-70 3O.J70 GATT AIL XXV he We Iepod 2dopteLJ Add.1 Reo1~~d 29.09.70
EC - oc'r$ 14 M- 14Oe70 GATr AU VIN Free trae WTItMG106 Rep a o~pted 18S14
aeveement MA.11.71
EC-OMO 1-A-71 4 -71 GATr M XXIV WTrEG102 Reput I M
Iunion 2 .06 72
EC- Switzerland 1-ar-73 27-O.7 GATTAUIV No trade WT/REG94 Fepuo &Opted 20S/198
and Liechtenstein noul _ 19.10.73_
AcoeBnm ID CAUt107
EC F of oww, 1-Ja73 74a-72 GATT. XXIV amOs 1387 Reo p 17
11.F- 1 mb xCta OF ti0 8t
PTN 73 18s/11 reque sd
~208/158
EC - Iceland 14. 73 4-Nov-7 GATTArt XXIV Fre We WT M Rep aoted 218' " " 19.10.73
EC - Cyprus 1Jum73 13-,nr-73 GATT At XXV Custms WFT " Reot opted 21/94wion 210.74
EC- Noway 1.73 13Ju73 GATTArLXXIV WTRI137 Repoadoptad 21/3qpsmen 29 74
CARICOM I.Au-73 14.Od-74 GATTr xLX ¢ts WTKR- RapolOpd 24wion 02MO.77
Bangkok Agreement 174m.R 2No- 76 .r a Ckwe Ote U 4418 Re2 e 20109L/I 4418/CMr. 14D3.7
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1-Jul-76 I28-Jl-76 I GAIT Art. XXIV Free trade WTRG0agreement IRlO Report 
adopted 1111.7
Free trade U4451 Report adopted 24S/63PATCRA 1-Feb-77 0-ec-76 GAT Art V agreement U4451/Add.1 11.11.77
EC - E yp o 1-Jul-77 15-Jul-77 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade 25S/114agreement WTREG10 Report adopted 17.05.78
Free trade WT/REG100 Report adopted 25S/142EC --Leann .J7 1.Jl.7 AI~rX~V agreement 17.05.78
EC - Syria 1-Jul-77 15-Ju-T7 GATT Art. XXIV Freem d WT/REG104 Report adopted 25S/123agreement 17.05.78
Examination n t
SPARTECA 1-Jan-81 20-Feb-81 Enabling Clause Other L/5100 requested
Accesion to Ar~asronte305/168
EC accession of Greece I-Jan-81 24-O-7 GATT Art XXIV customs L4845 Report adopted 9033
union
LAIA 18-Mar- 1-Ju-2 Enablig Clause Other 1.5w Examination n t81 1 E requested
CER 1-Jan-83 14-Apr-83 GATArt XXIV Freemde WTIREG111 Report adopted 31S/170-- agreement 02.10.84
United States- Israel 19-Aug- 13-Se GATT Art. XXIV Free trade U/5862 Report adopted 34S15885 agreement LJ5862/Add.1 14.05.87
EC acesIonof ortgalandAccession tos Porga and 1-Jan-86 1 -De GAIT Art XXIV cus omsReport adopted 93
Spain union I U5936 19.1038
CAN 25-May- 12-Odc2 Enabrmg Clause Other U6737 Examination not88 92requested
CER 1-Jar-89 22-Nov- GATS Art.V Services WT/REG40 Consultationsondral
E -agreement S/C/N/7 report
GSTP 19-Apr-89 25-Se Enabling Clause Other L/6564/Add.1 Examination not
requested
Laos - Thailand 20-Jug 29-Nov-91 Enabling Clause Other L/6947 Examination notI requested
EC-Andorra 1-Jul-91 25-Feb-98 GATf Art XXIV Customs WTREG53 Factual examination
union concluded
MERCOSUR 28-Nov- 5-Mar-92 Enabling Clause Customs WT/COMTD/1 Ueder factual91 union examination
AFTA 28-Jan-92 30-Oct-92 Enabing Clause Other /4581 Examination n trequested
EC - Czech Reub 1 Ar92 13-May- GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG18 Factual examination
96 agreement concluded
EC - Slovak I--2 13-May- GATT Art Free trade WTnsEG18 Faualt examination
Republic 96 agreement concluded
EC - Hungary 1-Mar-92 3-Apr-92 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG18 Consutations ondre
agreement report
EC - Poland 1-Mar-92 3-Apr-82 GAiT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG18 Factual examinationagreement concluded
EFTA - Turkey 1-Apr-92 6-Mar-92 GAIT Art XXIV Freemdt WT/REG86 Reporadopted 4S/48agreement Pnaotd 17.12.93
EFTA - Czech Free trade 41S/116
ublic1-Jul-92 3-Jul-2 GA Art XXIV agreement WT/REG87 Reportadopted 08.12.94
EC - Algeria
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1-Jul-92 3-Jul-92 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REOBti Report adoptedagreement
4RSd116
08.12.94
Dzech Republic - Slovak -an-93 3Apr-93 GATT Art XXIV Customs WIREG89 Repor dopted 41S/112
Republic union 04.10.94
EFTA - Israel -J93 -Dec-92 GATT At XXIV Free trade WTIREG14 Factual examinationagreement oncluded
Free trade WT/REG11 Consrltanson dra
CEFTA 1-Mar-93 3)-Jun-94 GATT Art. XXIV agreement report
Kyrgyz Republic - Russian 24-Apr-93 15-Jun-99 GATT Art XXIV Free tde WT/REG73 Under factual
Federation agreement examination
EC - Romania 1-May-93 -Dec-94 GAT Art xxiv Free trade WT/REG2 Factual exarinationagreement concluded
EFTA - Romania 1-May-93 24-May- GATArtXXlV Free trade WT/REG16 Factual examinatio
93 agreement conduded
Faroe Islands - Norway 1-Jul-93 13-Mar-96 GAiT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG.5 Factual examination
agreement oncluded
Fame Islands - Iceland 1-Ju93 23-Jan-96 GAIT Art. XXiV Free trade WT/REG23 Factual exaerinationagreement concluded
EFTA - Bulgaria 1-Jul-93 0-Jun-93 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG12 Factual examinaonagreement conduded
MSG 22-Jul-93 7-Oct-99 Enabling Clause Other WT/COMTDN9 Examination n t
WVT/COMTDI21 requested
EFTA - Hunar 1-Oct-93 3-Dee- GATTArtxxIV Free trade WT/REG13 Consultations n dralagreement report
EFTA - Poland 15-Nov- 20-Oct-93 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG15 Factual examination93 agreement concluded
EC - Bulgaria 31-Dee- 3 Dec- GATT Arlt XXIV Free trade WTREG1 Factual examination93 agreement concluded
EEA 1-Ja.94 1 0-Oct-96 ATS Art V Services WT/REG138 Under factual
agreement S/C/N/8 examination
NAFTA 1-Jan-94 1-Feb-93 GATTArt XXIV Free trade CEon4 onsultations n drat
agreement report
EC - Hunqary -Feb-94 27-Aug-S ATS ArtV Services WT/REGSO Consulttionsondrftagreement S/CMNi24 report
EC - Poland 1-Feb-94 27-Aug-96 GATS Art V Services WTiREG51 Factual examination
agreement S/C/N/25 conduded
BAFTA 1-Apr-94 15-Jun-99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG77 Factual examinationagreement conduded
NAFTA 1-Apr-94 1-Mar-95 GATS ArtV Services WT/REG4 Consulationson draagreement S/CIN/4 report
3ergla- Russian Federation 10-May- 21-Feb-01 GATT Arlt XXIV Free trade WT/REG118 Under factual94 agreement examination
COMESA 8-Dee-94 29-Jun-9 Enabling Clause Other WT/COMTD/N/3 Examinaon nut
requested
Ns 30-Dec- 1-Oct-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WTIREG82 Under factual94 agreement examination
Free brade Wr/REG44 Factual examinationlomana - Mdo 1-Jan-95 4sep- GAT Art XXIV agreement concluded '
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-C - Lithuania I1-Jan-95 I26-Sep-9,1GAIr Art. XXIV Free trade TRGagreement I TRG
Factual examination
concluded
EC - Estonia 1-Jan-95 30-Jun-95 GA ArtXXV Free trade WT/REG8 Factual examinationagreement conduded
EC - Latvia 1-Jan-95 30-Jun-9 GA r Free trade WT/REG7 Factual examinationagreement conduded
EC accession of Austria, 1-Jan-95 20-Jan-95 GAtT ArL XXIV Ausios WT/REG3 Consultations  draf
F'inland and Sweden eunion L7614/Add.1 report
EC accession f Austria, Accession to WT/REG3 Consultations  drafFinlan a we no1-Jan-95 20-Jan-95 GATS Art V servicesFtnland and Sweden agreement S/CIN/6 report
Services WTIREG1 Under factualEC - Bulgaria 1-Feb-95 25-Apr-97 GATS Art V agreement S/C/N/55 examination
Services WT/REG139 Under tacta1-Feb-95 9-Oct-96 GATS Art V Srie TRG3 ne ata
EC - Czech Republic agreement SiC/N/26 exnaration
Services WT/REG2 Under factual
EC - Romania 1-Feb-95 9-Oct-96 GATS Art. V agre SI/N12 eacatagreement S/C/N/27 exameination
EC - Slovak Services WT/REG52 Factual examination
Republic 1-Feb-95 .7-Aug- OATS Art V agreement S/C/N/23 concluded
Faroe Islands - Switzerland 1-Mar-95 8-Mar-96 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG24 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Free trade Factual examination
EFTA - Slovenia 1-Jul-95 19-Oct-95 GATTArt XXIV areemen t V!TREG20 Factu naagreement concluded
Kyrgyz Republic - Armenia 27-Oct-95 4-Jan-01 GATT Art XXIV Free trade /REG114 Under factual
agreement examination
Kyrgyz Republic - Kazakhstan 11-Nov- 29 Sep99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG81 Under factual95 agreement examination
SAPTA 7-Dec-95 2-Sep-93 Enabling Clause Other WT/COMTD/I1O Examination not
requested
Accssion to
CEFTA accession of Slovenia 1-Jan-96 8-Jan-98 GAT Art. XXV ree ade WTREG11 Consuttinson dra
agreement report
EC- Turkey 1-Jan-96 -Dec- GATT Art XXIV customs WT/REG22 Under factal
union examination
Estonia-- Uraine 14.Mar- 25-JuW- GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTIREG108 Factual examination
96 agreement concluded
EFTA - Estonia 1-Jun-96 25-Ju1-96 GATT Art. XXIV Free bade WT/REG28 Factual examinationagreement concluded
EFTA - Latvia 1-Jun-96 25-Jul-96 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG29 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Georgia - Ukraine 4-Jun-99 21-Feb-01 GATT AXXIV Free trade wrREG121 Under factual
agreement examination
Georgla- Azerbaijan 10-Ju!-96 21-Feb-01 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG120 Under factual
agreement examination
Slovenia - Latvia 1-Aug-96 20-Feb-97 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG34 Factual examination
agreement concluded
EFTA - Lithuania 1-Aug-96 25-Jul-96 GATTArXXIV Free trade WT/REG30 Factual examinationagreement concluded
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Slovenla - Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia 20-Feb-97 GATT Art, XXIV
Free trade
agreementWT/REG36
Factual examination
concluded
Kyrgyz Republic - Moldova 21-Nov- 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WrREG76 Factual examination
98 agreement concluded
Slovak Republic- Israel 1-Jan-97 30-Mar-98 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WTREG57 Factual examinatin
agreement concluded
Poland - Lithuania 1-Jan-97 3Dec-97 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG49 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Slovenia - Estonia 1-Jan-97 20-Feb-97 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG37 Factual examination
agreement concluded
EC - Faroe Islands 1-Jan-97 19-Feb-97 GAIT Art. XXIV Free trade wI/REG21 Under factual
agreement examination
Canada - Israel 1-Jan-97 23-Jan-97 GATT Art. Free trade WTREG31 Factual examinationagreement concluded
EC- Sovenia 1-Jan-97 11-Nov-98 GAIT Art.XXIV Free trade WT/REG32 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Slovenia- Lithuania 1-Mar-97 20-Feb-97 GAr Art. XXV Free trade Factual examinationagreement concluded
Israel - Turkey 1-May-97 189-May- GATr Art XXIV Free trade WTREG60 Factual examination98 agreement concluded
Accession to
CEFTA accession of Romania 1-Jul-97 8-Jan-98 GATT Art. XXIV free trade WT/REG11 Consultations  dral
agreement report
Slovak Republic - Latvia 1-Jul-97 14-Nov-97 GATT Art. X Free trade WT/REG47 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Free trade Factual examination
Slovak Republic - Lithuana 1-Jul-97 14-Nov-97 GATT Art XXIV WT/REG48
agreement concluded
Czech Republic - Latvia 1-Jul-97 13-Nov-97 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG45 Factua examination
agreement concluded
EC - Palestinian 1-Jul-97 30-Jun-97 GATArt. XXIV Free trade WT/REG43 Factual examination
uthorit agreement not started
Servces W/REG38 Under factual
Canada - Chile 5-Ju-97 13-Nov-97 GATSArt.V Srvices WICEG38 eaiatagre ment! S/C/NI65 ex mination
Canada - Chile 5-Jul-97 6-Aug-97 GAiT Art XXIV Free tade WTREG38 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Czech Republic - Lithuania 1-Sep-97 13-Nov-97 GAll Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG46 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Customs WTRG1 Under factualEAEC 8-Oct-97 6-Apr-99 GAIT Art. XXIV ui  eacntian
union G l examination
Fe ancta eainto
Czech Republic -Israel 1-Dec-97 30-Mar-98 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG56 Factual examination
agreement conctuded
Slovenla - Croatia 1-Jan-98 25-Mar-98 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG55 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Free trade W~G4 Under tactual
Kyrgyz Republic - Ukraine 19-Jan-98 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV ree e WT/REG74
agreement examination
1-Feb-91-Fe-Feb-02 GATSArt.V Services WT/REG145 Factual examination
EC - Lithuania agreement SC/1N1189 not started
20041
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EC - Estonia 1 -Feb-98 11-Feb-02 GATS Art V Services WTIREG144 Factual examinationagreement 51CIW188 I not started
918-May- GATT An. XXIV Free trade WTIREG59 Factual examinationRomania - Turkey 1-Feb-98 8 agreement concluded
Free trade WTRG4 Facnta examination
Hungary - Israel 1-Feb-98 4-Mar-98 GAIT Art. XXIV reee WTREG54eagreement concluded
Czech Republtc - Estonia 12-Feb- Free trade WTREG6 Factual examination98 3-Aug-98 GA T ArL X agreement concluded
Slovak Republic - E 12-Feb- GATT Art X Free trade WT/REG63 Factual examination9 8 agreement onduded
EC -Tunisia 1l-Mar-98 .3-Mar-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WTIREG69 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Poland - Israel 1-Mar-98 25-Feb-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WTREG65 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Lithuania - Turkey 1-Mar-98 8-Jun-98 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTIREG61 Facnat examinationagreement concuded
29Man- Free tade WTRG5 Under tactuaKyrgyn Republic- Uzbkistan 98 15-Jun-99 GATr Art XXIV ageee t IeRam n
98agreement examination
Hun 1-Apr-98 12-May- GA17 Art. XXN Free trade WT/REG58 Factual examination98 agreement concluded
Estonia - Turkey 1-Jun-98 .3-Mar-99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG70 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Czech Republic - 1-Sep-98 24-Apr-99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade Wr/REG67 Factual examination
Turkey agreement concluded
Slovak Republic - I 1-Sep-98 24-Mar-99 GATT Art XXIV Free bade WT/REG68 Factual examination
Turkey agreement onduded
Slovenia - Israel 1-Sep-98 8-Mar-99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTIREG66 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Georgia - Armenia 11-Nov 1-Feb-01 GATTArtXXIV Free trade WTIREG119 Under factual98 agreement examination
Estonia - Faroe Islands 1-Dec-98 26-Jan-99 GAIT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG64 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Bulgaria- Turkey 1-Jan-99 4-May-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG72 Factual examinaion
agreement concluded
Accession toA~nuin ta onnuttatinsn on draf
CEFTA accession of Bulgaria 1-Jan-99 24-Mar-99 GATT Art XXIV free trade WT/REG11 report
agreement repo
Servnces WTIREG146 Factual examinationEC - Slovenia 1-Feb-99 11-Feb-02 GATS rLV agemnViii o tre
agreement S/C/N190 not started
EC - Latvia 1-Feb-99 ;11-Feb- GATS Art. V Services WT/REG143 Factual examination
agreement S/C/H/187 not started
Poland - Latvia 1-Jun-99 -Sap- GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTIREG80 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Poland - Faroe Islands 1-Jun-99 18-Aug-99 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG78 Factual examination
agreement oncluded
WTICOMTDM/13 Examination n t
,EMAC 24-Jun-99 28-Sep-M Enabling Clause Other WTICOMTP24 requested
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EFTA - Palestinian
Authoritv 1-Jul-99 21-ep-9c GATT Art. XXIV
Free boade
agreement
Factual examinationnot started
Georgia - Kazakhstan 16-Jul-99 21-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV Free tade WTIREG123 Under factual
agreement examination
Chile - Mexico 1-Aug-99 14-Mar-01 GATS Art V Services WTIREG125 Factual examination
agreement S/CN/142 not started
Chile - Mexico 1-Aug-99 27-Feb-01 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG125 Factual examination
agreement not started
EFTA - Morocco 1-Dec-99 20-Feb-00 GATT Au. XXIV Free trade WTIREG91 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Georgia- Turkmnenistan 1Jan-00 1-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WTEGl2 Under factual
agreement examination
EC - South Africa 1-Jan-00 14-Nov-X GATT ArtXXIV Free trade W/REG113 Factual examination
agreement not started
WAEMU/UEMOA 1-Jan-00 3-Feb-0 EnablingClause Other WT/COMTD/N/11 Examination n t
WT/COMTD/23 requested
Bulgaria - Former Yugoslav 1-Jan-00 21-Jan-00 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTrREG90 Factual examination
Republic of Macedonia agreement oncluded
Hungary - Latvia 1-Jan-00 20-Oec-99 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG84 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Free tade Under factuat
EC - Morocco 1-Mar-00 8-Nov-00 GATTArt XXIV WTIREG112 ea uaagreement examination
Hungary- Lituania I-lMIar-00 2 -Oec-9. GATT Art XXIV Free bade WT/REG83 Factual examinationagreement conduded
14-May- GATT Art XXlV Free trade WT/REG107 Factual examinationPoiand-Turkey 1-May-00 0 gemn ocue
ODagreement oncluded
Free tadeFataexmnio
Turkey- Slovenia 1-Jun-00 6-Mar-02 GATT Art XXIV WT/REGt35 Factual examinationagreement not started
EC - Israel 1Jun-00 7-Nov-00 GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG110 Factual examinationagreement concluded
Mexico - Israel 1-Jul00 27-Feb-01 GATT Art XXIV Free trade WTIREG124 Factual examinationI agreement not started
Latvia-Turkey 1-Ju-00 22-Jan-01 GATT At Free trade WEG16 Factual examination
agreement concluded
Free trade WT/REG109 Under factual
EC - Mexico 1-Jul-0 1-Aug-00 GATT Art. XXIV Freeme examination
agreement examiation
AC 7-Jul-0 11-Oct-00 Enabling Clause Other WTCOMTD/N514 Examination n tWT1COMTD25 requested
Turkey- Former Yugoslav 1.Sep.00 22-Jan-01 GATT Art XXV Free trade WT/REG115 Factual examinationRepublic of Macedonia agreement concluded
New Zealand - Free trade Under factual
Sinaore1-Jan-01 4Sep01 GATT Art XXIV agreement wm/REG27 e aton
New Zealand - 1-Jan-01 4-Sep-01 GATS Art. V Services WT/REG127 Under factual
Sinapore agreement SIC/N/169 examiation
2004]
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EFTA - Former
Yugqoslav Republic of
Macedonia
1-Jan-01 131-Jan-O I GAT" ArL XXIV Free trade
agreementWr/REGl 17 
Factual examination
concluded
EC - Mexico 1-Mar-01 21-Jun-02 GATS Art. V Services WT/REG109 Factual examination
agreement S/C/N/l 92 not started
Hungary - Estonia 1-Mar-01 4-Oct-01 GAT Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG128 Factual examinationagreement not started
EC - FYROM 1-Jun-01 .-Nov-01 GAT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG129 Underfactualagreement examination
EFTA -Mexico 1-Ju.1 25-JuWl GATTArL XXIV Free trade WT/REG126 Factual examinationagreement not started
EFTA -Mexico i-Jul-0l 25-Jul-01 GATS Art.V Serces WTIREG126 Factualexaminatin
agreement S/CN/6 notnat
India - Sri Lanka 15-Dec- 26-Jun-02 Eabling Clause Free rade ExaTICe'rDno1t01 ag eement requested
United States - 17-Dec- 18-Oct-02 GATS ArV Services WT/REG134 Factual examination
Jordan 01 agreement S/C/N/193 not started
United States - 17-Oec- 5-Mar-02 GAIT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG134 Factual examination
Jordan 01 agreement not started
EFTA - Jordan 1-Jan-02 22-Jan-02 GATr Art XXIV Free trade WT/REG133 Factual examination
agreement not started
EFTA - Croatia 1-Jan-02 22-Jan-02 GAIT Art XXIV Free trade WTREG132 Factual examination
agreement not started
Slovenia - Bosnia and 1-Jan-02 21-Jan GATT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG131 Factual examination
Herzegovina agreement not started
Chile- Costa Rica 15-Feb- 24-May GATSArtV Services WT/REG136 Factual examination02 02 agreement S/C/N/191 not started
Chile- Costa Rica 15-Feb- 14-May- GAIT Art. XXIV Free trade WT/REG136 Factual examination02 02 agreement not started
EC - Croatia 1-Mar-02 0-Dec-02 GAIT At. XXIV Free trade WT/REG142 Factual examination
agreement not started
Free trade Factual examination
EC - Jordan 1-May-02 -Dec- GAIT Art XXIV agreement o/REG141 nut started
EFTA 1-Jun-02 3-Dec-02 GATS Art V Services S/CN207 Factual examinationagreement not started
Free trade Exaraination not
Canada - Costa Rica 1-Nov-02 17-Jan-02 GATT Art XXIV WT/REG147
agreement requested
30-Nov- Services WT/REG140 Factual examinationJaan - Sin apor 02 14-Nov GATSAAtV agreement S/C/NM not started
apan - Sin 30-Nov- 14N GAT XXIV Free trade WIEG140 Factual examinationiapore 02 agreement not started
EFTA -Singqapore l-Jan-o3 24-Jan-M GATS ArtV Services WT/REG148 Examination notagreement S/C/N226 requested
Free trade Examinatin not
EFTA - Siniapore 1-Jan-03 24-Jan-OS GATr Art XXIV WT/REG148agreement, requested
ECO not 22-Jul-92 Enabling Clause Other 1.17047 Examination n t
available requested
not 11-W-84 Enabling Clause Other U5676 Examination n tGCC avaiiable 1 E C O requested
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